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Environmental Change and Human Mobility: Trends, Law and 
Policy
Susan F. Martin
Abstract: Enhancing the protection of persons displaced by natural disasters and 
the impacts of climate change will require sustained attention. This article identifi es 
practical solutions, many of which are currently under consideration by govern-
ments and international organizations, to improve the lives of millions of people af-
fected by environmental crises. It begins with a brief overview of why people move, 
the nature of those movements, and the relationship between human mobility and 
adaptation to environmental change by highlighting three types of mobility – mi-
gration, displacement and planned relocation. Next, the international and regional 
level will be discussed, with particular focus on legislative and policy frameworks 
for addressing human mobility in the context of environmental change. The article 
identifi es gaps in existing frameworks as well as recent efforts to address them, 
particularly through mini-multilateral initiatives aimed at identifying principles and 
practices that should guide governmental action. The article concludes that efforts 
to improve responses require a better evidence base than currently exists on issues 
such as the environmental determinants of migration, displacement and planned re-
location; the multi-faceted ways in which environmental factors relate to the many 
other causes of population movements in the cases of human mobility; and the im-
pact of such movements on the well-being of migrants, communities of origin, and 
communities of destination.
Keywords: Migration · Environmental change · Displacement · Planned relocation
1 Introduction
The environment is but one of many reasons that prompt people to move, some-
times operating on its own but more often through other mechanisms, particularly 
loss of livelihoods affected by environmental disruption (see for example, Black et 
al. 2011; Etzold et al. 2014; Foresight Project 2011; Ginetti 2015; Hugo 2011; Kniveton 
et al. 2011; White 2011). Nevertheless, there has also been growing recognition that 
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climate change poses profound consequences for human mobility. According to 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), “climate change over the 21st century is projected to increase displacement 
of people” (IPCC 2014: 20). The IPCC’s detailed review of the evidence indicated that 
“[e]xtreme weather events provide the most direct pathway from climate change to 
migration” but in the longer term, “sea level rise, coastal erosion, and loss of agri-
cultural productivity (…) will have a signifi cant impact on migration fl ows” (Adger 
et al. 2014: 767-769).
The human consequences – including on mobility – have not escaped the atten-
tion of governments, international organizations and civil society. In 2010, the Con-
ference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP) 
adopted the Cancun Adaptation Framework, which called on all countries to take 
“measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard 
to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where 
appropriate, at national, regional and international levels.” The resolution refl ected 
growing awareness that environmental change, and climate change1 in particular, 
was already having a profound impact on the mobility of people and was likely to 
have still more impacts in the years ahead. In addressing human mobility, the reso-
lution differentiated between displacement, migration and planned relocation, set-
ting out three markedly different responses to environmental processes and events. 
This article uses “mobility” to encompass the three different forms of movement 
and “migration”, “displacement” and “planned relocation” when specifi c forms of 
mobility are discussed.2 A working description of each group is provided in the next 
section.
In Doha in 2012, the COP reiterated the need for more attention to human mobili-
ty within the context of loss and damage, noting the need for greater understanding 
of “how impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement 
and human mobility (UNFCCC 2012: 23).” In this regard, loss refers to the “inability to 
respond to climate stresses (i.e. the costs of inaction)”, whereas damage is defi ned 
as “costs associated with existing coping and adaptive strategies (cf. erosive coping 
strategies and mal-adaptation)” (Warner et al. 2012). The COP 21, which took place 
in Paris in 2015, requested “the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International 
1 Environmental changes include a broader understanding of hazards and processes than en-
compassed by climate change. Examples of the former include earthquakes and human-made 
environmental degradation and destruction, such as nuclear and industrial accidents. Climate 
change includes rising sea levels, drought, cyclones and other weather-related events.
2 In contrast to refugees, who are defi ned in international law, there are no legal defi nitions of 
migration, displacement or planned relocation. The closest is a working defi nition provided by 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) of environmental migration: “Environmental 
migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progres-
sive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged 
to leave their homes or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move 
either within their country or abroad (IOM 2007).” This defi nition is so broad, however, that it 
encompasses displacement and planned relocation under the rubric of migration, making it dif-
fi cult to distinguish among the forms of movement.
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Mechanism3 to establish, according to its procedures and mandate, a task force 
(…) to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and 
address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change (UNFCCC 
2016: 8).” Although it did not specify the form that the recommendations are to take, 
the statement indicated that the work of the taskforce should “complement, draw 
upon the work of and involve, as appropriate, existing bodies and expert groups 
under the Convention including the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed 
Countries Expert Group, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside 
the Convention (UNFCCC 2016: 8).” This directive represented the fi rst attempt by 
the UNFCCC process to develop concrete recommendations on ways to address an 
important form of human mobility associated with climate change.
Progress is also being made in developing guidance for states on ways to en-
hance protection of those who move in the context of environmental change. These 
efforts stem from broad recognition that current legal and institutional frameworks 
do not apply in many of the situations arising when people move as a result of 
natural disasters or the slow-onset effects of climate change. Two state-led initia-
tives are paving the way for rethinking the policy frameworks that apply in these 
cases: The Nansen Initiative for cross border displacement from natural disasters 
and climate change, and the Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative for non-
nationals already in countries experiencing natural disasters (and confl ict). These 
initiatives are being driven by states themselves, rather than international organiza-
tions, academic institutions or nongovernmental agencies. As such, they represent 
a commitment from states to formulate principles and guidelines to address a com-
pelling issue. 
The following sections present a brief overview of why people move, the nature 
of those movements, and the relationship between human mobility and adapta-
tion to environmental change. It highlights the three types of mobility – migration, 
displacement and planned relocation – discussed in the Cancun Adaptation Frame-
work. The article then turns to responses at the international and national levels, 
with particular focus on legislative and policy frameworks for addressing human 
mobility in the context of environmental change. It seeks to identify gaps in exist-
ing legal and institutional frameworks. The next section examines the Nansen and 
MICIC initiatives in greater depth. Finally, the conclusion explains why the author is 
cautiously optimistic about these mechanisms and the potential for more effective 
responses.
3 The UNFCCC established the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associat-
ed with Climate Change Impacts in 2013 “to address loss and damage associated with impacts 
of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries 
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.” See http://unfccc.int/
adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/items/8134.php for additional information.
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2 Setting the Stage
This section provides an overview of the determinants of movements, forms of mo-
bility, and the role of mobility in regard to adaptation to environmental risks and 
changes. 
2.1 Determinants of Mobility in the Context of Environmental Change
The report of the UK Foresight Project (2011) provides an excellent framework for 
identifying the factors that help determine not only whether people move but also 
when and where they go (see Fig. 1). The chart includes macro level factors, demon-
strating the multiple drivers of movement (economic, social, political, demographic 
as well as environmental). However, these drivers alone will not necessarily result 
in the movement of people. The decision to migrate or stay is also infl uenced by 
personal and household demographic and socio-economic characteristics as well 
as intervening obstacles and facilitators that determine whether movement is feasi-
ble. Household vulnerability and resilience to environmental changes – that is, the 
capability to cope with or adapt to them – often determines the degree to which 
people need to move and their ability to get out of harm’s way. The most vulnerable 
populations may well be those who are trapped in fragile eco-systems, unable to 
support themselves and unable to move to places of greater safety and opportu-
nity. The mix of all of these determinants that lead to the decision to move or to 
stay makes research on the determinants of mobility resulting from environmental 
change a complex endeavor.
Fig. 1: Drivers of International Migration
Source: Foresight Project: Migration and Global Environmental Change 2011
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Within this context, research is converging on the role that climate change is 
likely to play in accord with these other factors. As discussed above, the IPCC’s 
review of the literature concludes that climate change will indeed play an important 
role in future movements, potentially even more than in the past. More specifi cally, 
there are four paths by which climate change may affect human movement either 
directly or, more likely, as per Foresight, in combination with other factors:
• Changes in weather patterns that contribute to longer-term drying trends 
that affect access to essential resources such as water and negatively 
affect the sustainability of a variety of environment-related livelihoods in-
cluding agriculture, forestry, fi shing, etc. Those most affected by drought 
may, however, have lower levels of migration if the drying pattern reduc-
es household income so that they are unable to move (see, for example, 
Bylander 2016; Gray/Mueller 2012; Jülich 2011). 
• Rising sea levels and glacier melt cause massive and repeated fl ooding 
and render coastal and low-lying areas uninhabitable in the longer-term 
(Warner/van Geest 2013; de Sherbinin et al. 2011; Wrathall 2012; Dun 
2011; Shen/Gemenne 2011).
• Increased frequency and magnitude of weather-related acute natural haz-
ards, such as hurricanes and cyclones, which already destroy infrastruc-
ture and livelihoods and require people to relocate for shorter or longer 
periods (IFRC 2012; Adger et al. 2014). As climate change intensifi es these 
events, even more people will be at risk. 
• Competition over natural resources that may exacerbate pressures con-
tributing to confl ict, which in turn precipitates movements of people. Pro-
longed drought appears to have exacerbated tensions in Syria, contribut-
ing to the 2011 demonstrations against the Assad regime, which in turn 
led to the protracted confl ict that has displaced millions of people (Kelley 
et al. 2015). Confl ict also clearly makes it more diffi cult to address the 
needs of climate-change affected populations, as witnessed in Somalia 
in 2011, during the severe drought in the Horn of Africa. Only Somalia 
among the drought affected areas experienced high levels of famine and 
displacement.4 In 2017, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
warned of the widespread threat of famine in South Sudan, Nigeria and 
Yemen if there is an escalation of the ongoing confl icts in these countries 
(UNHCR 2017).
It is important to note that drivers of mobility include not only factors at work 
in source communities and countries that may push people to leave their homes. 
They also include pull factors in potential areas of destination that make them at-
tractive destinations. As the Foresight diagram indicates, both actual and perceived 
differences between conditions in source and destination communities are likely to 
infl uence mobility. 
4 See UNHCR statistics at http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/country/516282cf5/unhcr-statis-
tical-yearbook-2011-11th-edition.html.
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2.2 Forms of Mobility
The Foresight fi gure also captures gradual and sudden onset drivers, which can 
in turn infl uence gradual or sudden movements. The fi rst two scenarios – longer-
term drought and rising sea levels – are likely to cause slow-onset migration, in 
which people seek new homes and livelihoods over a lengthy period as conditions 
in their home communities worsen. In many cases, this migration is voluntary and 
is a strategy to reduce the risk of being exposed to current and future shocks. Mi-
grants seeking to avoid such environmental changes may resemble labor migrants, 
seeking better livelihood opportunities in a new location. This will especially occur 
if people move in anticipation of worsening conditions, rather than as a direct re-
action to the changes taking place. The third and fourth scenarios – acute natural 
hazards and confl ict – are likely to create conditions that cause large-scale displace-
ment, often in the context of emergencies. In these situations, those who move 
may resemble refugees and internally displaced persons who have fl ed situations 
beyond their individual control. The movements will likely involve displacement of 
entire communities who will often move en masse to new locations with little or no 
warning. In both cases, there may be individuals and households who are unable or 
unwilling to leave even in the face of life-threatening situations. For them, planned 
relocation may be needed. These two forms of environmental hazard (acute and 
slow onset) and their resulting patterns of movement (migration, displacement and 
planned relocation) need to be assessed separately to determine the appropriate 
policy responses and program requirements. 
In both slow onset and acute cases, movement may be temporary, cyclical or 
permanent. The decision as to whether return is possible involves a range of vari-
ables, including the extent to which the environmental causes – either direct or 
through other channels – is likely to persist or frequently reoccur. Policies in the 
receiving communities and countries, depending on whether the movement is in-
ternal or international, will also affect the likelihood for return or settlement in the 
new location. In addition to immigration policies, the policies affecting return and 
settlement include land use and property rights, social welfare, housing, employ-
ment, and other frameworks that determine whether individuals, households, and 
communities are able to fi nd decent living conditions and pursue adequate liveli-
hoods. Return and reintegration is also affected by plans and programs to mitigate 
future dislocations from environmental hazards. 
Different types of environmental stressors also affect the destinations of those 
who move. Many experts believe that most mobility in the context of environmental 
change will be domestic (except for low-lying small island states without higher el-
evation) or immediately cross-border. Such migration may be particularly challeng-
ing as the receiving communities and countries will likely have few resources, legal 
structures, or institutional capacity to respond to the needs of the migrants. Geo-
graphical proximity may also mean that destination areas face some of the same 
environmental challenges as areas of migration origin (e.g. drought, desertifi cation) 
and may offer little respite in this regard. Some long-distance movements are in-
evitable given the scope of migration today, as witnessed by the attempt of many 
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Syrian and other asylum seekers to reach Europe. It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that there are about 6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria 
itself and about fi ve million Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The 
numbers attempting to enter Europe are much smaller by comparison, estimated at 
about 1.3 million in 2015 (Connor 2016).
2.3 Mobility and Adaptation
As discussed above, the Cancun Adaptation Framework adopted language that 
placed mobility fi rmly on the climate-change adaptation agenda. Largely because 
of the complexities in mobility patterns discussed above, the Cancun Framework 
outlined three different forms of mobility – migration, displacement and planned 
relocation.
Climate adaptation strategies related to mobility fall into two major categories: 
First, and more commonly, governments view adaptation to climate change as a 
way to reduce emigration pressures and allow people to remain where they are by 
modifying agricultural practices, management of pastoral lands, infrastructure such 
as dykes and coastal barriers, fi shing patterns and other strategies to reduce pres-
sures on fragile eco-systems. 
Second, movement of people to other locations may instead be seen as an ad-
aptation strategy itself by climate change-affected countries (Stojanov et al. 2014; 
Martin 2012; Geddes/Somerville 2013; Rademacher-Schulz et al. 2014). Some coun-
tries see migration as a way to reduce population pressures in places with fragile 
eco-systems; others recognize that resettlement of some populations may be inevi-
table, but should be accomplished with proper planning. Moreover, people already 
living outside vulnerable areas may be important resources to help communities 
adapt and respond to climate change, a perspective that is of particular interest to 
development policy makers. Just as migrants are contributing to the broader de-
velopment of their home countries, such strategies envision that the diaspora may 
have the technical knowledge and fi nancial resources to help communities cope 
with the effects of climate change. Finally, in the absence of appropriate relocation 
strategies, populations that should be moved away from hazardous situations may 
be trapped in place, unable to leave on their own.
Even countries facing similar climate changes differ in the extent to which they 
focus on the interconnections between human mobility and adaptation and the 
ways in which they understand the relationship. Smith and MacNamara (2014) note 
the different approaches of Tuvalu and Kiribati to the prospect of relocation of large 
numbers of their citizens. They refer to Tuvalu’s approach as preventative action to 
avoid migration: “The migration issue was not wholly denied as a possible future 
scenario for Tuvalu but this appears to be something that would only be considered 
in the case of a tsunami or similar disaster event, rather than the progressive incre-
mental environmental degradation of the islands” (Smith/MacNamara 2014: 53). By 
contrast, Kiribati views migration as an “active policy option,” refl ecting frustration 
at the slow pace of international negotiations regarding the mitigation of climate 
change (Smith/MacNamara 2014: 55).
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Research is scarce on both issues – the effi cacy of strategies to reduce emigra-
tion pressures, and the impacts of different forms of mobility on those who move 
and communities of origin and destination when used as an adaptation strategy. 
Interdisciplinary research will likely be needed, engaging the expertise of research-
ers familiar with agriculture, fi shing, infrastructure, land use and tenure and other 
relevant issues as well as those who understand the determinants of migration. 
Strategies that focus on specifi c environmental responses that do not take into ac-
count the other macro, meso and micro factors discussed above are unlikely to 
be effective in infl uencing mobility. Similarly, research on the strengths and weak-
nesses of these approaches will need to consider multiple variables in assessing 
the effi cacy of the adaptation strategies. As many of these strategies are still in the 
planning stage, thinking through what factors to consider in evaluations is essential. 
A new body of research is beginning to assess the impact of mobility as an ad-
aptation strategy. The Rainfalls project, for example, posits four likely outcomes of 
mobility for those who move as well as their families left behind: (1) some families 
will prosper as a result of movements; (2) others will survive but not be materially 
better off; (3) still others will be worse off having left their home communities; and 
(4) a fi nal group will be trapped in place unable to leave their homes (Warner/Afi fi  
2014). These are far from self-evident since a range of factors, including pre-existing 
levels of resilience and vulnerability, as well as the forms of movement that take 
place, determine which impacts are experienced by households and even entire 
communities. 
Research to replicate or challenge these fi ndings in other locations and with oth-
er environmental drivers would help expand the understanding of the potentially 
multiple impacts of mobility on those most affected by environmental change. Simi-
larly, understanding the impacts derived from different forms of movement would 
help identify the strengths and weaknesses of adaptation strategies themselves. 
For example, more evidence is needed to determine if those who move voluntarily 
in anticipation of environmental harm show greater capacity to improve their situa-
tion than those who are spontaneously displaced or forced to participate in planned 
relocation programs. Third parties (e.g., humanitarian and development) may offset 
some of the harms that might otherwise occur when people are forced to leave 
home but there is little evidence as to best practices in this area. 
Since a number of governments, including those as different as small island 
countries in the Pacifi c and the United States, are considering planned relocation of 
their citizens from environmentally hazardous areas to new sites, learning the les-
sons from development projects involving relocation – such as hydroelectric dams 
– is imperative.5 Research on these projects has raised many questions about their 
impacts on the resettled groups, many of whom were worse off after relocation 
than they had been previously (Cernea 1997, 2005). In 2001, the World Bank adopt-
ed guidelines on involuntary resettlement to address some of the more egregious 
5 See case studies referenced in Georgetown University et al. (2016) for further examples.
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actions.6 UNHCR, the Brookings Institution and Georgetown University developed 
guidance on planned relocation in the context of natural disasters and environmen-
tal change that would improve the protection of those who are relocated as well as 
the communities into which they move, as discussed below (Brookings Institution et 
al. 2015; Brookings Institution et al. 2014; Georgetown University et al. 2016).
3 Legal and Policy Gaps
This section discusses legal and policy frameworks for protecting those who move 
in the context of environmental change. It highlights gaps in current law and policy 
with regard to both internal and cross-border movements. It focuses on interna-
tional and regional law as well as national policies.
3.1 Internal Movements
Internal mobility is a matter of state sovereignty. The limits of sovereignty are not 
absolute, however. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides clear guid-
ance in Article 13 that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and resi-
dence within the borders of each state.” Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) affi rms that “Everyone lawfully within the territory 
of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and free-
dom to choose his residence.” The ICCPR provides certain exceptions: “The above-
mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are 
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre pub-
lic), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent 
with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.” To the extent that climate 
change produces conditions that undermine national security, public order or public 
health, which may be the case in extreme natural disasters or confl ict, then govern-
ments would have the right to enact provisions that would require people to move. 
A further relevant framework are the Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-
ment and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Inter-
nally Displaced Persons in Africa. The Guiding Principles are not legally binding, 
but many states have adopted them into national law. They describe internally dis-
placed persons or groups of persons as those “who have been forced or obliged 
to fl ee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a 
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed confl ict, situations of generalized 
violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who 
have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” The AU Convention, 
which went into force in 2012, explicitly recognizes that there will likely be displace-
ment from climate change, stating in Article 4: “States Parties shall take measures 
6 See the guidelines at https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/090224b0822
f89db.pdf.
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to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or 
human made disasters, including climate change.” 
The Guiding Principles affi rm that all persons have the “right to be protected 
against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual resi-
dence.” In the case of climate change-induced displacement, arbitrary displace-
ment would include situations in which individuals are forced to fl ee for reasons 
that “are not justifi ed by compelling and overriding public interests”. In the case of 
natural disasters, such displacement is arbitrary, “unless the safety and health of 
those affected requires their evacuation”. The Guiding Principles also state that “the 
authorities concerned shall ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in order 
to avoid displacement altogether. Where no alternatives exist, all measures shall be 
taken to minimize displacement and its adverse effects.”
The Guiding Principles emphasize the need for consultation with the affected 
parties, stating that the free and informed consent of those to be displaced shall be 
sought. The authorities responsible for displacing persons are encouraged to in-
volve those affected, particularly women, in the planning and management of their 
relocation. In particular, care should be taken to ensure that “proper accommoda-
tion is provided to the displaced persons, that such displacements are effected in 
satisfactory conditions of safety, nutrition, health and hygiene, and that members of 
the same family are not separated.” 
3.2 International Mobility
States possess broad authority to regulate the movement of foreign nationals 
across their borders. Although these authorities are not absolute, states exercise 
their sovereign powers to determine who will be admitted and for what period. The 
authority of states is limited by certain rights accorded foreign nationals in interna-
tional law. There are no international instruments that specifi cally address interna-
tional movements stemming from environmental factors. Those moving because 
of environmental factors have the same rights and responsibilities as others who 
cross international borders. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) defi ne the basic rights of all persons. Importantly, UDHR Article 13 also de-
clares that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to 
return to one’s own country.” The Declaration does not, however, require any other 
country to admit people who exercise their right to leave. Similarly, UDHR Article 14 
states that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution,” but there is no corresponding obligation on the part of states to 
offer asylum. The obligation, as discussed below, is not to forcibly return someone 
to where they face a well-founded fear of persecution.
There are no legally binding conventions that apply specifi cally to persons whose 
displacement is correlated with climate change. The UN Convention on the Protec-
tion of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families would apply if those who 
move enter the labour market in a host country. There are no specifi c provisions, 
however, within the Migrant Workers Convention for those moving because of envi-
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ronmental factors compared to any other reasons. Some may be covered under the 
1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.7 The 
Convention defi nes refugees as persons who were unable or unwilling to avail them-
selves of the protection of their home countries because of a “well-founded fear of 
persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or member-
ship in a particular social group.” While few persons seeking protection because of 
purely environmental reasons are likely to meet the defi nition, those fl eeing from 
the impacts of climate change may qualify if their lives are in danger because they 
are unable to access resources because of a protected characteristic (that is, race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion).
In Africa, the scope of coverage might be greater because the 1969 OAU (now 
AU) Refugee Convention includes those who, “owing to external aggression, occu-
pation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part 
or the whole of his country of origin or nationality (emphasis added), is compelled to 
leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside 
his country of origin or nationality.” The Cartagena Declaration, adopted by Latin 
American countries in 1984, has a similar broadening of the refugee defi nition to 
include “among refugees persons who have fl ed their country because their lives, 
safety or freedom have been threatened by (…) other circumstances which have 
seriously disturbed public order,” but it is not binding regional law. To the extent 
that the impacts of environmental change seriously disturb public order, persons 
forced to leave their homes may be covered under these instruments (Lopez 2007).8 
The immigration policies of most destination countries are not conducive to re-
ceiving large numbers of environmental migrants, unless they enter through already 
existing admission categories. Typically, destination countries admit persons to fi ll 
job openings or to reunify with family members. Employment-based admissions 
are usually based upon the labour market needs of the receiving country, not the 
situation of the home country. Family admissions are usually restricted to persons 
with immediate relatives (spouses, children, parents and, sometimes, siblings) in 
the destination country.
Humanitarian admissions are generally limited to refugees and asylum seekers 
– that is, those who fi t the defi nition in the UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees: persons with a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, re-
ligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. As is 
the case regarding international law, most people moving because of environmental 
harm will be unlikely to meet the legal defi nition of a refugee, forced to fl ee because 
7 The protocol eliminated geographic (that refugees be from Europe) and time (pre-1951) limits 
on the Convention, making it a universal document.
8 Lopez (2007: 390) acknowledges that the “International Conference on Central American Refu-
gees (CIREFCA) report interpreting the Cartagena Declaration distinguishes, however, between 
‘victims of natural disasters’ and other events ‘seriously disturbing the public order,’ and ob-
serves that the former do not qualify as refugees.” While Cartagena may not apply in natural 
disasters, it could apply in human-made environmental crises that result in serious disruptions 
of public order.
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of loss of livelihood or habitat and not because of persecutory policies. A New Zea-
land case highlights the barriers to refugee claims based on the effects of climate 
change. A Kiribati citizen who had overstayed his visa applied for asylum citing the 
effects of climate change on his home country. The Supreme Court of New Zealand 
held in 2015 that “[i]n relation to the Refugee Convention, while Kiribati undoubtedly 
faces challenges, Mr Teitiota does not, if returned, face ‘serious harm’ and there is 
no evidence that the Government of Kiribati is failing to take steps to protect its citi-
zens from the effects of environmental degradation to the extent that it can.”9 The 
court did not rule out that another case involving serious environmental harm from 
climate change might meet the persecution bar for refugee status. Presumably, if 
a country were to protect some of its nationals from environmental harm while al-
lowing others to suffer because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group or political opinion, a claim to asylum might be appropriate.
Despite the lack of law and formal policies, governments respond frequently, al-
beit mostly in an ad hoc way, to those who have been displaced by natural hazards. 
The 2010 earthquake in Haiti provides a good example of humanitarian admissions 
policies that were used by governments to protect persons not already on their 
territory and who did not qualify as refugees. The Dominican Republic responded 
almost immediately, permitting an estimated 160,000 Haitians to cross onto its ter-
ritory. Many of those permitted entry had been seriously injured and required medi-
cal care. Family members were also allowed to enter the Dominican Republic to stay 
with the injured during their convalescence (Weiss Fagen 2013).
Other Haitians received humanitarian visas to enter Brazil. At fi rst, the Haitians 
applied for asylum but the Brazilian government determined that they did not fi t the 
refugee defi nition. Also recognizing that they were not seeking admission for purely 
economic reasons, Brazil offered the alternative of humanitarian visas. Initially, the 
determinations were made at the border. Thousands of Haitians had travelled to Ec-
uador, which had suspended visa requirements for Haitians in 2008, and then made 
their way to the Brazilian border. Subsequently, Brazil instituted processing proce-
dures in Haiti for persons seeking humanitarian admissions. At fi rst, these were for 
temporary admissions but Brazil now has a category for permanent admissions. In 
September 2015, the IOM established the Brazil Visa Application Centre (BVAC) to 
facilitate applications for these visas. 
Countries such as Canada and the United States sped up the entry of persons 
who had already applied for admission, recognizing that they would remain in life-
threatening situations if forced to wait for their turn in the admissions queue. For 
Canada, for example, “this meant expediting and to some extent stretching the ex-
isting immigration categories through which Haitians would be eligible to come to 
Canada without changing existing immigration rules and regulations.” These ap-
plied primarily to family reunifi cation applications. The province of Quebec, which 
controls its own immigration policy, expanded its notion of family reunifi cation to 
9 Ioane Teitiota, Applicant and the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation And 
Employment, Respondent, Supreme Court of New Zealand, SC 7/2015 [2015] NZSC 107.
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include “formerly inadmissible categories of adult brothers and sisters, step broth-
ers and sisters and adult children, along with their own families.” As a result, Que-
bec admitted about 9,000 Haitians in 2010 alone.
Governments also have applied policies for deferral of deportation of those dis-
placed by natural disasters. These range from statutory measures to ad hoc ones. 
One of the most well-developed statutory provisions is in U.S. legislation enacted 
in 1990 to provide temporary protected status to persons “in the United States who 
are temporarily unable to safely return to their home country because of ongoing 
armed confl ict, an environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary 
conditions.”10 Environmental disaster may include “an earthquake, fl ood, drought, 
epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but 
temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected.”10 In the case of en-
vironmental disasters, as compared to confl ict, the country of origin must request 
designation of TPS for its nationals. 
Importantly, TPS only applies to persons already in the United States at the time 
of the designation. It is not meant to be a mechanism to respond to an unfolding cri-
sis in which people seek admission from outside of the country. It also only pertains 
to situations that are temporary in nature. On the other hand, countries are often 
re-designated and “temporary” protection is offered to their nationals over lengthy 
periods. For example, TPS was originally triggered in 1999 in the wake of Hurricane 
Mitch, which had severe impacts on Nicaragua and Honduras. Its most recent ex-
tension is until January 5, 2018. Those granted TPS are left in limbo throughout 
these periods; they are unable to become permanent residents unless they meet 
the criteria of other immigration statuses (e.g., they have married a U.S. citizen). 
If the environmental disaster has permanent consequences, however, a designa-
tion of Temporary Protected Status is not available or it may be lifted. When a volca-
no erupted in Montserrat in 1997, TPS was granted to its citizens and was extended 
six times. In 2005, however, it was ended because “it is likely that the eruptions will 
continue for decades, [and] the situation that led to Montserrat’s designation can 
no longer be considered ‘temporary’ as required by Congress when it enacted the 
TPS statute.” 
Another signifi cant factor is that the designation is discretionary, to be made by 
the Secretary of Homeland Security. Countries or parts of countries are designated, 
allowing nationals only of those countries to apply. Notably, TPS was not triggered 
for the hurricanes that destroyed large parts of Haiti but was offered following the 
2010 earthquake and has since been extended.
Sweden and Finland have also included environmental migrants within provi-
sions of their immigration policies. Sweden includes within its asylum system per-
sons who do not qualify for refugee status but have need for protection. Such a 
person in need of protection “has left his native country and does not wish to return 
there because he: [1] has a fear of the death penalty or torture [2] is in need of pro-
10 Immigration and Naturalization Act Sec. 244. 1/ [8 U.S.C. 1254] https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/
docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-29/0-0-0-7238.html.
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tection as a result of war or other serious confl icts in the country [3] is unable to 
return to his native country because of an environmental disaster.” The decision is 
made on an individual basis. Although many prospective recipients of this status 
are presumed to be in temporary need of protection, the Swedish rules foresee 
that some persons may be in need of permanent solutions. Similarly, in the Finnish 
Aliens Act, “aliens residing in the country are issued with a residence permit on the 
basis of a need for protection if […] they cannot return because of an armed confl ict 
or environmental disaster.”
A number of other countries provide exceptions to removal on an ad hoc ba-
sis for persons whose countries of origin have experienced signifi cant disruption 
because of natural disasters. After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, for example, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and Canada suspended deportations of those from 
such countries as Sri Lanka, India, Somalia, Maldives, Seychelles, Indonesia and 
Thailand. A number of governments announced similar plans after the 2010 earth-
quake in Haiti. 
To date, there are no examples of legislation or policies that address migration 
or relocation of persons from slow onset climate changes that may destroy habi-
tats or livelihoods in the future.11 For the most part, movements from slow onset 
climate change and other environmental hazards that limit economic opportunities 
are treated in the same manner as economically motivated migration. Persons mov-
ing outside of existing labour and family migration categories are considered to 
be irregular migrants. In the absence of a strong humanitarian basis for exempting 
them from removal proceedings (which is unlikely in the slow onset situation), these 
migrants would be subject to the regular systems in place for mandatory return to 
their home countries. As their immediate reasons for migrating would be similar to 
that of other irregular migrants – that is, lack of economic opportunities at home and 
better economic opportunities abroad – there would be little reason for destination 
countries to manage these movements outside of their existing immigration rules.
There are also no binding international instruments governing the rights of those 
who are relocated because of the impacts of environmental change or the respon-
sibilities of governments in requiring or supporting such actions. Recognizing the 
gap, UNHCR, in collaboration with the Brookings Institution and Georgetown Uni-
versity and the support of the European Commission, launched a project in 2011 to 
develop guidance in this area. The project focused only on planned relocation with-
in affected countries, leaving discussion of cross-border relocation to the Nansen 
Initiative (see below). As the Cancun Framework did not defi ne planned relocation, 
the fi rst task was to offer a defi nition: 
11 New Zealand’s Pacifi c Access Category (PAC), under which 75 people from Tuvalu, 75 from 
Kiribati, and 250 from Tonga may immigrate to New Zealand each year, is sometimes described 
as climate change related legislation. The program is based on employment, however, not envi-
ronmental factors. The immigrants must be between 18-45 years old, have an offer of employ-
ment in New Zealand, have English skills, meet minimum income requirement, undergo a health 
check, and have no history of illegal entrance.
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Planned Relocation is (…) a planned process in which persons or groups 
of persons move or are assisted to move away from their homes or 
places of temporary residence, are settled in a new location, and provid-
ed with the conditions for rebuilding their lives. Planned Relocation is 
carried out under the authority of the State, takes place within national 
borders, and is undertaken to protect people from risks and impacts 
related to disasters and environmental change, including the effects of 
climate change. Such Planned Relocation may be carried out at the in-
dividual, household, and/or community levels (Brookings Institution et 
al. 2015: 9).
The Guidance then sets out core principles: Planned relocation should be “un-
dertaken for the benefi t of Relocated Persons and in a manner that respects and 
protects their rights and dignity” (Brookings Institution et al. 2015: 10). Generally, 
planned relocation is a measure of last resort when other disaster risk reduction 
or adaptation options fail. As such, “states must have compelling reasons, robust 
evidence, and a sound legal basis for undertaking Planned Relocation” (Brookings 
Institution et al. 2015: 11). Those most affected by planned relocation – the relo-
cated and other affected communities12 – should be consulted. And, every effort 
should be made to enable relocated persons “to improve, or, at a minimum restore, 
their living standards” and host populations “to maintain their pre-existing living 
standards, or to attain the same living standards as relocated persons, whichever 
is higher.” This last principle is important because too often, involuntary resettle-
ment in the context of major construction projects has resulted in lowered stand-
ards of living as well as economic, social and cultural loss (Cernea 1997; DeWit 
2006).13 From principles, the guidance moves to practical approaches to protect 
those affected by relocation in the pre-, during- and post-relocation phases. It em-
phasizes the need for states, as the entities with principal responsibility for planned 
relocation, to develop and enact the legal and policy basis for undertaking these 
programs; establish the institutional framework for carrying them out as well as 
the criteria for making decisions throughout a planned relocation; put in place an 
impartial and equitable grievance, review, confl ict resolution, and redress mecha-
nisms; provide for timely, suffi cient, and sustainable funding; and ensure planned 
relocation is incorporated into other intersecting and crosscutting issues and activi-
ties, including development and land-use frameworks (Brookings Institution et al. 
2015). The guidance was derived from consultations with experts from within and 
outside government in multiple fi elds: development, environment, humanitarian 
efforts, human rights, migration and refugees, disaster risk reduction and adapta-
12 Other affected persons include host populations, persons who choose not to take part in 
planned relocation, and persons who live in close proximity to the communities to be relocated 
but who do not qualify for relocation. The second and third group may be affected by the relo-
cation if services, infrastructure and/or markets are relocated along with people.
13 In his seminal 1997 work, Cernea lists 8 harms from involuntary resettlement: (a) landlessness; 
(b) joblessness; (c) homelessness; (d) marginalization: (e) food insecurity; (f) loss of access to 
common property resources; (g) increased morbidity; (h) community disarticulation. Many of 
these problems persist as examined in a 2015 special issue of Development in Practice (25.5) on 
development-induced displacement and involuntary resettlement in Asia.
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tion. The current phase of the project involves consultation with states and other 
stakeholders and the development of more operational guidance to promote effec-
tive implementation. It has also taken on new partners, including the IOM and UN 
University’s Institute for Environment and Human Security. 
4 Organizational Arrangements
Just as the international legal frameworks for addressing climate change-induced 
movements are weak, so are the institutional roles and responsibilities at both the 
international and the national levels. With the exception of the refugee regime, in 
which clear responsibility is given to UNHCR, there is no existing international re-
gime for managing international movements of people. This is not to say that there 
is a total absence of governance. There are a plethora of international organizations 
that have some responsibilities related to both internal and international move-
ments. 
Recognizing the potential importance of climate change as a driver of humani-
tarian crises (including large-scale displacement), the members of the Interagency 
Standing Committee (IASC) for coordination, policy development and decision-
making on humanitarian assistance established a task force on climate change. 
The IASC was created in 1992 through Resolution 46/182 of the General Assembly, 
with members drawn from the United Nations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
movement, the IOM and key nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. The 
IASC taskforce on climate change leads the preparation of high-quality analytical 
inputs to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
process, and provides guidance as appropriate to the IASC on integrating climate 
risk management into agency policies, operations and relevant IASC guidelines and 
tools.
The Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, comprised of aca-
demic and humanitarian institutions and coordinated by UNHCR, was formed in 
2013 to serve as a conduit for translating knowledge into policies that consider the 
protection of people on the move. While serving a useful role in providing longer-
term recommendations, the advisory group has had limited success in infl uencing 
the outcomes of the 2015 negotiations in Paris (COP 21). As its recommendations 
remain relevant, they are worthy of extended examination.
The Advisory Group called for human mobility to be addressed in all its forms 
(displacement, migration, planned relocation), and considered in policies that take 
into account the full range of societal impacts (mitigation, adaptation, and loss and 
damage). It highlighted the needs of migrants, refugees and people displaced inter-
nally or across borders, and called on Parties to “[r]ecognize that safeguards should 
be adopted to prevent and reduce the displacement of populations and its negative 
impacts, in the context of climate change mitigation and adaptation projects and 
policies (Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility 2015).”
The Advisory Group strongly encouraged states party to UNFCCC to take meas-
ures, including in their National Adaptation Plans, to prevent and reduce internal 
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and cross-border displacement in close consultation with communities at risk of 
displacement. Among the efforts governments could make would be increasing 
resilience among displaced persons and host communities, and formulating partici-
patory, dignifi ed and sustainable responses. Crucially, the Advisory Group also rec-
ommended that States “[r]ecognize that human mobility measures within national 
and regional climate change adaptation plans, policies and strategies may require 
adaptation funding, including from the operating entities of the fi nancial mechanism 
of the UNFCCC supporting both adaptation and loss and damage as well as other 
mechanisms” (Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility 2015).
The Advisory Group members reiterated the necessity for loss and damage poli-
cies to address climate change-related displacement and emphasized the “catalyt-
ic” role that the UNFCCC can play in supporting relevant organizations and frame-
works that provide assistance and protection to persons displaced in the context 
of disasters and climate change. More specifi cally, the group called for a climate 
change displacement coordination facility to “serve as a forum for sharing experi-
ence and enhancing capacities to plan and implement climate adaptation measures 
that avoid displacement, facilitate voluntary migration, and encourage participatory 
and dignifi ed planned relocation” (Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human 
Mobility 2015). Finally, the Advisory Group emphasized the importance of securing 
funding to support local, national and regional climate change adaptation, resilience 
building, and disaster risk management plans and activities. The Paris Conference 
of the Parties to the UNFCCC resolved to establish a taskforce to take on some of the 
responsibilities outlined in the recommendation for a displacement coordination 
facility but did not provide for the fi nancing mechanism that the Advisory Group 
proposed.
On a more operational level, there is no designated organization to assist and 
protect those who move in the context of climate change. UNHCR has clear respon-
sibility for refugees and those who are internally displaced by confl ict, but it does 
not have responsibility for those displaced by natural hazards. The organization has 
nevertheless been drawn into providing assistance during several notable natural 
disasters, such as the Tsunami in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Somalia (2004), Cyclone 
Nargis in Burma (2008), China’s earthquake (2008), fl oods in Pakistan, Bangladesh 
and Myanmar/Burma (2010), and the Nepal earthquake in 2015. In many of these 
cases, UNHCR was already providing aid to confl ict-induced refugees and internally 
displaced persons. IOM has responsibility for camp management and, on a case by 
case basis, protection of those displaced by natural hazards. It has also played an 
important role in stimulating research on environmental migration, displacement 
and planned relocation. The role of both organizations is limited, however, particu-
larly as compared to UNHCR’s mandate for protection of refugees, because of the 
absence of a legally binding convention that spells out the rights of those whose 
mobility is affected by climate change and other environmental shocks.
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5 New Initiatives to Address Protection Gaps
Given the dearth of legal, policy and institutional frameworks at the international, 
regional or national level specifi cally focused on the impacts of climate and oth-
er environmental changes on human mobility, a number of initiatives have been 
launched to promote guidelines that would be applicable in these situations. Sir 
Peter Sutherland (2016), the Special Representative of the Secretary General on 
International Migration, has dubbed these efforts mini-multilateralism – that is, ef-
forts by states to develop non-binding guidance based on existing principles and ef-
fective practices. The success of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 
shifting perceptions and practices in countries throughout the world (including the 
promulgation of a regional convention in Africa) is the backdrop for these efforts. 
This section discusses two such initiatives that pertain to displacement, migration 
and planned relocation in the context of natural disasters and the slow onset ef-
fects of climate change: 1) the Nansen Initiative and its successor, the Platform on 
Disaster Displacement; and 2) the Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative.
5.1 The Nansen Initiative and the Platform on Disaster Displacement
The Nansen Initiative,14 was launched in 2011 at a Ministerial Conference commem-
orating the 60th anniversary of UNHCR’s founding and adoption of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. The aim was to develop an agenda for improving protection of people 
displaced cross borders by natural disasters and the slow onset effects of climate 
change. The impact of climate change on displacement had long been a concern to 
António Guterres, then the High Commissioner. As early as 2007, he gave voice to 
his concerns:
When we consider the different models for the impact of climate change, 
the picture is very worrying. The need for people to move will keep on 
growing. One need only look at East Africa and the Sahel region. All 
predictions are that desertifi cation will expand steadily. For the popula-
tion, this means decreasing livelihood prospects and increased migra-
tion. All of this is happening in the absence of international capacity and 
political will to respond. (Guterres 2007) 
The following year, Assistant High Commissioner for Protection Erika Feller sum-
marized the dilemma before the UNHCR Executive Committee:
“New terminology is entering the displacement lexicon with some 
speed. The talk is now of ‘ecological refugees,’, ‘climate change refu-
gees,’ the ‘natural disaster displaced.’ This is all a serious context for 
UNHCR’s efforts to fulfi ll its mandate for its core benefi ciaries. (…) The 
mix of global challenges is explosive, and one with which we and our 
14 The initiative was named after Fridtjof Nansen, the famous explorer who was named High Com-
missioner for refugees by the League of Nations in 1921 and received the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1922 for his work on behalf of refugees and displaced persons.
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partners, government and non-government, must together strike the 
right balance (Feller 2008).”
In an address before the Security Council in November 2011 – with famine and 
displacement in Somalia heavily on his mind – High Commissioner Guterres re-
turned to the theme: “we should be addressing the more complex issue of the way 
in which global warming, rising sea levels, changing weather patterns and other 
manifestations of climate change are interacting with and reinforcing other global 
imbalances, so as to produce some very powerful drivers of instability, confl ict and 
displacement” (Guterres 2011).
In the lead up to the Ministerial Conference, the organization commissioned new 
research on climate change and displacement. Preparatory meetings were held in 
Bellagio (UNHCR 2011a) and Oslo (The Nansen Conference 2011) to discuss gaps 
in the international response to the evolving phenomena. The June 2011 Oslo con-
ference resulted in the Nansen Principles, which outlined core approaches for ad-
dressing both internal and international displacement. Recognizing that the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement already covered those displaced by natural dis-
asters and other environmental disruptions, the Nansen Principles urged action on 
cross border movements: “A more coherent and consistent approach at the inter-
national level is needed to meet the protection needs of people displaced externally 
owing to sudden-onset disasters. States, working in conjunction with UNHCR and 
other relevant stakeholders, could develop a guiding framework or instrument in 
this regard” (The Nansen Conference 2011: 5).
The initial hope was that governments would back reforms in the institutional 
arrangements, particularly for responding to natural disasters, in the Ministerial 
Conference. This would have helped clarify under which situations UNHCR should 
take leadership in assisting and protecting victims. Governments did not agree that 
UNHCR should become more systematically involved with those displaced by natu-
ral disasters or climate change. A number argued that UNHCR was already over-
whelmed with the growing number of refugees and internally displaced persons. 
The Ministerial Conference instead gave very indirect acknowledgement of the 
problem:
“We note that today’s challenges in providing protection and achieving 
solutions continue to be serious, interconnected and complex. (…) We 
will reinforce cooperation with each other and work with UNHCR and 
other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate, to deepen our understand-
ing of evolving patterns of displacement and to agree upon ways to re-
spond to the challenges we face in a changing global context” (UNHCR 
2011b). 
The Swiss and Norwegian governments did take up the call in the Nansen Princi-
ples for more attention to protection needs, pledging to fund an intergovernmental 
process that would examine the issue and make recommendations for enhancing 
protection in both acute emergencies and slow onset processes. 
Switzerland and Norway asked Walter Kälin, formerly the Special Representative 
of the Secretary General on the human rights of internally displaced persons and 
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one of the principal architects of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, to 
take on the leadership of the initiative, serving as the Chair’s Envoy. The Nansen Ini-
tiative was clear in stating, however, that it did “not seek to develop new legal stand-
ards, but rather to build consensus among states on the elements of a protection 
agenda, which may include standards of treatment.” (The Nansen Initiative 2017) 
There was no expectation that the process would lead to a set of guiding principles 
on cross-border displacement that would be equivalent to the ones developed for 
internally displaced persons. Rather, the Nansen Initiative sought to identify exist-
ing practices that complement refugee and other humanitarian protection regimes 
in use by countries in protecting those who are displaced by natural disasters and 
other forms of environmental change.
The initiative also differed from the Guiding Principles process in that it was 
state-led, rather than UN-led. It was governed by a Steering Committee, chaired by 
Switzerland and Norway, and included Australia, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Germa-
ny, Kenya, Mexico and the Philippines. A Consultative Committee15 was formed to 
bring the expertise of representatives from international organizations dealing with 
displacement and migration issues, climate change and development, researchers, 
think tanks and non-governmental organizations to bear. A group of “Friends of 
the Initiative” allowed other governments to provide advice and remain informed 
of the deliberations. Finally, a secretariat supported the work of the initiative. The 
main fact-fi nding activities were a series of regional consultations to pull together 
evidence about the impacts of natural disasters and climate change on displace-
ment and to solicit the views of governments and civil society. The secretariat also 
distilled the lessons of research for the initiative’s consideration and commissioned 
background papers on a number of topics.
The Agenda for Protection, adopted as the outcome of the Nansen Initiative, fo-
cuses on three principal areas of action. The fi rst is to improve the collection of data 
and to enhance knowledge on cross-border disaster-induced displacement. More 
specifi cally, the agenda recommends improvements in the collection, consolidation 
and analysis of “gender- and age-disaggregated data regarding the overall number 
of people displaced in disaster contexts, both internally and across international 
borders, based on clear criteria and effective methods” (The Nansen Initiative 2015: 
45). It also calls for new “methodologies to identify those at risk of being displaced 
in disaster contexts, including across international borders” and new research to 
“determine to what extent men and women already rely on migration as a strategy 
to cope with the effects of natural hazards and the effects of climate change, and 
what lessons can be learned for improving the benefi ts of migration and addressing 
related protection risks” (The Nansen Initiative 2015: 45). Finally, it emphasizes the 
need for additional data and analysis of planned relocation processes in the context 
of disasters and effects of climate change. 
15 The author was a member of the Consultative Committee.
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The second area of the agenda focuses on “humanitarian protection measures 
for cross-border disaster-displaced persons, including mechanisms for lasting solu-
tions” (The Nansen Initiative 2015: 44). This section is most pertinent to the devel-
opment of measures to complement and augment protection of those displaced 
by environmental factors. These measures include ones related to the admission 
of disaster displaced persons from abroad as well as those preventing the return 
of displaced persons to countries experiencing natural disasters and the effects 
of climate change. The agenda points to the need for new legal instruments and 
policies that would, for example, grant “temporary entry and stay for cross-border 
disaster-displaced persons, such as through the issuance of humanitarian visas or 
other exceptional migration measures” (The Nansen Initiative 2015: 26).
The Nansen Initiative emphasized that governments could use existing legal 
frameworks, such as existing temporary labor migration and humanitarian admis-
sions programs, more creatively to permit entry of those needing protection. It iden-
tifi ed a number of examples in current practice (The Nansen Initiative 2015):
• Granting visas that authorize travel and entry upon arrival for people 
from disaster-affected countries, or temporarily suspending visa require-
ments; 
• Prioritizing and expediting the processing of regular migration categories 
for foreigners from affected countries following a disaster, or waiving cer-
tain admission requirements for such categories; 
• Relying upon regular (sub-)regional or bilateral free movement schemes 
to permit the temporary entry and stay of disaster displaced persons, and 
providing for the suspension of documentation requirements in disaster 
situations, recognizing that such persons may not possess, or have lost 
and are unable to acquire documentation normally required; 
• Granting temporary entry and stay for cross-border disaster-displaced 
persons, such as through the issuance of humanitarian visas or other ex-
ceptional migration measures; 
• Granting entry and temporary stay for a group or “mass infl ux” of cross-
border disaster- displaced persons; 
• Developing transhumance agreements to facilitate the cross-border 
movement of pastoralists and their livestock, particularly in situations 
when drought endangers the health and lives of humans and animals; 
• Reviewing asylum applications of and granting refugee status or simi-
lar protection under human rights law to displaced persons in disaster 
contexts who meet the relevant criteria under applicable international, 
regional, or national law; 
• Exploring at sub-regional and regional levels, where relevant, whether 
and under what circumstances regional instruments on refugee, and sim-
ilar protection under human rights law, can and should be interpreted as 
applying to cross-border disaster-displacement situations; and 
• Reviewing and harmonizing existing humanitarian protection measures 
at sub-regional and regional levels.
•    Susan F. Martin208
The Agenda for Protection recognized, however, that these measures are not 
consistently implemented. Instead, they are “largely unpredictable, because they 
generally rely upon the discretionary power of relevant authorities as opposed to 
a legal obligation to admit or permit the stay of disaster displaced persons” (The 
Nansen Initiative 2015: 28).
Nansen also identifi ed examples of mechanisms that were complements to the 
refugee non-refoulement standard. The effective practices in this regard include:
• Providing such persons with humanitarian protection measures such as 
suspending their deportation or extending or changing their existing mi-
gration status on humanitarian grounds if they would experience extreme 
hardship as a consequence of the disaster in case of return to the country 
of origin; or their country of origin has declared a disaster and is tempo-
rarily unable to manage the return of its citizens for reasons related to the 
disaster; and 
• Providing persons eligible for humanitarian protection measures with ad-
equate information on the possibility to benefi t from such protection, and 
their rights and responsibilities once such protection has been granted.
The third set of recommendations is aimed at strengthening the management of 
disaster displacement risk in the country of origin so that those affected by natural 
disasters and the effects of climate change would not need to cross international 
borders. These include
“integrating human mobility within disaster risk reduction and climate 
change adaptation strategies, and other relevant development pro-
cesses; … improving the use of planned relocation as preventative or 
responsive measure to disaster risk and displacement; and … ensuring 
that the needs of IDPs displaced in disaster situations are specifi cally 
addressed by relevant laws and policies on disaster risk management or 
internal displacement” (The Nansen Initiative 2015: 44).
Finally, the agenda notes that legal migration can prevent displacement since it 
allows people to move in a safe and orderly manner. 
The Agenda was endorsed by 109 governmental delegations during a global 
multi-sectoral consultation in October 2015. More than 360 participants from gov-
ernments, international organizations, academic institutions and civil society at-
tended. That so large a number of governments endorsed the Agenda was impres-
sive. Those who spoke at the consultation noted the utility of the agenda and the 
fl exibility of governments to adopt its recommendations in accord with national law. 
Subsequently, the German government took on the chairmanship of the process, 
announcing the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD) in May 2016 at the World 
Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul. The PDD has four main goals in furthering the 
Agenda for Protection. First, it seeks to address knowledge and data gaps. The long-
term goal is to produce “global information management, analysis, tracking of trends 
and reporting regarding cross-border disaster-displacement, including on its root 
causes” (Platform on Disaster Displacement 2016a). In the short- to medium-term, 
the aim is to help ensure the inclusion of displacement in post-disaster needs and 
damage assessment tools and methodologies and in national censuses; strengthen 
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risk mapping and forecasting modelling to identify vulnerable populations at risk 
of displacement and to better understand existing and emerging displacement risk 
drivers; and commission new research, as needed, to fi ll information gaps.
The second aim is to promote policy and normative development to fi ll gaps in 
protection, as outlined in the protection agenda. In keeping with the Nansen per-
spective, the focus is not on international conventions but rather with law and policy 
at the regional and national level. The PDD intends to work with regional consulta-
tive processes to develop guidance for countries on norm development, referenc-
ing the “Guide to Effective Practices on Admission and Stay for Persons Moving 
across Borders in the Context of Disasters” produced by the Nansen Initiative and 
Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) in Central and North America (Platform 
for Disaster Displacement 2016b). It will strive to support “legal and policy devel-
opment at domestic and regional level and support the development of bilateral 
and regional frameworks regarding admission, stay and non-return of cross-border 
disaster-displaced persons” (Platform for Disaster Displacement 2016b).
The third aim fl ows naturally from the second area for the PDD. The aim is to 
enhance the use of effective practices identifi ed by the Nansen Initiative. The focus 
is on humanitarian protection measures, such as policies that provide admission 
and temporary relief from removal for disaster displaced persons. Other practices 
that the PDD will promote include consideration of displacement in national, bilat-
eral and regional contingency plans, disaster risk management and humanitarian 
response plans. It will also enhance use of options, such as planned relocation and 
voluntary migration, which are designed to reduce the likelihood that people will be 
displaced by natural hazards or the slow-onset impacts of climate change (Platform 
on Disaster Displacement 2016c).
Mainstreaming disaster-induced displacement across sectors, mandates and ar-
eas of expertise related to its multi-causality is the fourth aim of the PDD. This area 
stems from recognition that a “key gap and challenge highlighted by the Nansen 
Initiative is the need to bring together and link multiple policy and action areas that 
to date have been uncoordinated in order to better address cross-border disaster-
displacement and its root causes.” To achieve this aim, the PDD will work with states 
as well as stakeholders from multiple sectors and disciplines. It will also coordinate 
with other initiatives, such as those commissioned with follow-up to the Sendai 
Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction, the UNFCCC Warsaw International Mecha-
nism for Loss and Damage’s Task Force on Displacement, and the follow-up to the 
World Humanitarian Summit.
5.2 Migrants in Countries in Crisis
The origins of the MICIC Initiative are similar to Nansen, whose success infl uenced 
its development. Sir Peter Sutherland, the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General, played the role that High Commissioner Guterres did in urging govern-
ments to fi ll the protection gap for non-nationals caught in acute emergencies re-
sulting from confl ict and natural disaster. The mass displacement of migrant work-
ers in Libya during the 2011 confl ict, followed by similar confl ict-related crises in 
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Cote d’Ivoire and Syria, in addition to the natural disasters in Japan, Thailand, and 
the United States that affected millions of non-nationals, generated substantial in-
terest among governments, civil society and the private sector. In support of Sir 
Peter and with funding from the MacArthur Foundation, Georgetown University’s 
Institute for the Study of International Migration commissioned a paper outlining 
the protection gaps (Koser 2014) and produced desk studies of the major crises 
involving displacement of non-nationals.
The call for action was met with a positive response by the United States and 
the Philippines. In her plenary statement at the 2013 High Level Dialogue on Migra-
tion and Development, Assistant Secretary Anne Richard, thanking Sir Peter and 
noting the seriousness of the problem, pledged on behalf of the United States to 
chair what became the MICIC initiative. She used language similar to Nansen’s in 
describing the initiative: “I envision a State-led process aimed at examining the re-
sponsibilities of different actors in these crisis situations” (Richard 2013). A working 
group was subsequently named; in addition to the US and the Philippines, Australia, 
Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, and the European Commission (EC) also served 
on it as did IOM, UNHCR, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development 
(ICMPD), and ISIM. 
MICIC also worked in similar ways to Nansen. A grant from the United States es-
tablished a secretariat based at IOM; the EC funded regional consultations and the 
US and Australia supported consultations with civil society and the private sector, 
as well as members and friends of the Intergovernmental Consultation on Migra-
tion, Refugees and Asylum Seekers. The EC also supported a research program that 
examined the longer-term impacts of the crises on migrants and the US supported 
capacity building for countries experiencing the impacts of these crises. 
The results of the consultations and research contributed to a set of principles, 
guidelines and effective practices that were presented on June 15, 2016 at the Unit-
ed Nations. The principles focused on core rights and responsibilities. The duty to 
save lives in confl ict and disasters is the fi rst responsibility; as such, the humanitar-
ian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence should govern responses 
to migrants in these crisis situations. To ensure effective protection, the principle 
of non-discrimination, particularly by immigration status, when lives are at risk per-
meates the recommendations. The principles and resulting guidelines emphasize 
that states have primary responsibility but that other stakeholders, including non-
nationals themselves, play an important role in ensuring protection. In that respect, 
Principle 6 states clearly that “[m]igrants are rights holders and capable actors, resil-
ient and creative in the face of adversities, not merely victims or passive recipients 
of assistance” (MICIC 2016: 16). 
The guidelines are described as “targeted suggestions, organized by theme, 
that identify in broad terms the actions needed to better protect migrants in coun-
tries experiencing crises. States, private sector actors, international organizations, 
and civil society can use the Guidelines to inform and shape crisis preparedness, 
emergency response, and post-crisis action” (MICIC 2016: 19). They are organized 
around the phases of crises: pre-, during- and post-crisis. Each is elaborated with 
concrete practices that would aid their implementation. The most detail is provided 
Environmental Change and Human Mobility: Trends, Law and Policy    • 211
on pre-crisis emergency preparedness since this is the phase in which much can 
be done to lay the groundwork for effective action during crises. The guidelines 
recognize, however, that crises often take on lives of their own and that needs and 
contexts depart from even the best laid plans. As such, they recommend continual 
assessment of the situation and fl exibility to adapt and innovate as needed during 
the emergency response period. They also take into account that the post-crisis 
stage requires special attention to the long-term needs of migrants displaced by 
confl ict and disasters as well as to the needs of communities to which they may 
need to relocate.
While many of the issues raised in MICIC apply equally in confl icts and natural 
disasters, the initiative did make distinctions where applicable. A discussion brief 
prepared for MICIC observed that one of the most important differences is in the 
role of national authorities in the affected countries. Whereas in confl icts, the na-
tional authorities may be part of the problem in protecting citizens and non-citizens 
alike, “in most cases of natural disasters, governments are willing to assist all per-
sons on their territory requiring emergency assistance, including non-citizens. They 
may not have the capacity, however, to carry out all of the tasks needed to protect 
citizens and non-citizens alike and may require the assistance of other actors (Mar-
tin 2016)” As a result, MICIC emphasized integration of the needs and capabilities of 
migrants into existing and disaster risk reduction, early warning, emergency prepar-
edness and emergency response systems, with particular attention to migrant-spe-
cifi c issues such as their ability to read and comprehend the host language. It also 
urged states to institute awareness-raising programs for migrants about prevention, 
preparedness, and emergency response procedures in host countries. Recogniz-
ing that some migrants may leave post-natural disaster, while others enter affected 
areas, MICIC also recommended measures to prevent the exploitation of migrants 
working in post-disaster reconstruction jobs by providing prevailing wages, moni-
toring work conditions, providing safety equipment as needed, and enforcing laws 
against human smuggling, traffi cking in persons, occupational health and safety, 
and other labor violations (MICIC 2016).
6 Conclusion
This review of trends in environmental change and human mobility identifi es some 
areas of research and policy development that are needed to respond more effec-
tively. It is not meant to be exhaustive in laying out a research or policy agenda. In 
the area of research, more attention is needed to improve the evidence base on the 
environmental determinants of migration, displacement and planned relocation; the 
multi-faceted ways in which environmental factors relate to the many other causes 
of population movements in the cases of migration, displacement and planned relo-
cation; and the impact of migration, displacement and planned relocation undertak-
en in the context of environmental change on the well-being of migrants, communi-
ties of origin, and communities of destination. As compared to even ten years ago, 
there has been great progress in fi lling the gaps in evidence and knowledge of the 
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mobility implications of environmental change generally and climate change more 
specifi cally. With the increasing attention of governments to these issues, there is 
reason for cautious optimism that this progress will continue.
At the legislative and policy level, there are also grounds for cautious optimism. 
The Nansen and MICIC initiatives represent new ways in which governments and 
other stakeholders are attempting to address persistent protection gaps for those 
affected by environmental change. There are four reasons for optimism. First, unlike 
earlier efforts that focused primarily on the adoption of binding international con-
ventions, these initiatives are less formal, more ad hoc and less binding. They are 
more pragmatic, given the reluctance of states to adopt and ratify new binding in-
struments related to movements of people. Promulgation of the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement has proven to be a highly effective way to gain visibility 
and improved protection for a population that had not previously received suffi cient 
attention. The Guiding Principles have been recognized widely as applicable to a 
broad range of persons forced to leave their homes because of events beyond their 
control. They have broad support, as witnessed by the 2005 World Summit’s en-
treaty to states and international organizations to implement them. Many individual 
countries have incorporated them into national law and the African Union has prom-
ulgated a binding convention based on them. 
Second, because states are leading these efforts, there is a built-in constituency 
for ensuring their implementation. The Nansen Initiative has been succeeded by the 
Platform for Disaster Displacement, which was announced at the World Humanitar-
ian Summit in May 2016. The platform will follow up on Nansen and implement the 
recommendations of the Protection Agenda by building “partnerships between pol-
icymakers, practitioners and researchers and constitute a multi-stakeholder forum 
for dialogue, information sharing as well as policy and normative development.” 
The Chairs of the MICIC initiative have pledged a similar follow-up process, with the 
continuation of the secretariat’s capacity-building and other activities.
Third, these processes have been highly inclusive in terms of regional scope and 
participation. Members of the steering/working groups have come from all regions. 
Regional variations have been solicited in consultations that brought together gov-
ernments, civil society, the private sector, international organizations and the re-
search community. The resulting recommendations have been vetted with multi-
ple stakeholders although responsibility for issuing them ultimately rested with the 
state leads.
Finally, the ad hoc nature of these processes allows them to address emerging 
issues and concerns more effectively than more formal mechanisms that are often 
tied to specifi c mandates. MICIC was criticized by some civil society organizations 
and a few governments at its inception because its focus was restricted to migrants 
affected by confl ict and natural disasters. The critics urged the working group to ad-
dress the problems of those in crises stemming from other causes – for example, ir-
regular migrants stranded by smugglers en route to their destination. Fearing that it 
would be more diffi cult to build consensus around solid recommendations on other 
populations, the working group held fast. However, MICIC made a clear statement 
that “Notwithstanding the limited scope of the MICIC initiative, it is hoped and ex-
Environmental Change and Human Mobility: Trends, Law and Policy    • 213
pected that its outcomes will be useful for States and other stakeholders in address-
ing a broader range of migration scenarios.” In fact, many of the recommendations 
in the MICIC guidelines do apply more broadly and civil society groups could readily 
use them to advocate for others moving in the context of environmental change. 
Most notably, Principle 2 states: “As human beings, all migrants are entitled to hu-
man rights, regardless of their immigration status. At all times, the human rights of 
migrants should be respected, protected, and fulfi lled in a non-discriminatory man-
ner and in accordance with applicable international law” (MICIC 2016: 15). Mem-
bers of the working group have also been supportive of the recommendation in 
the Secretary General’s report for the High Level Meeting on Large-Scale Migration 
and Refugee Movements to form a working group similar to MICIC on vulnerable 
migrants more generally.
This is not to say that the ad hoc, non-binding nature of the processes is without 
problems. As has been seen with regard to internally displaced persons, protec-
tion is still highly dependent on the willingness of states to implement the guiding 
principles and the international community to intercede when states are unwilling 
or unable to fulfi ll their responsibilities. Enhancing protection of those displaced 
by natural disasters and the impacts of climate change will require sustained at-
tention. Mechanisms such as the Nansen and MICIC initiatives, and their follow-up, 
are promising ways to foster greater attention to the protection gaps and practical 
solutions to improve the lives of millions of people affected by crises. In the long 
term, however, they will only be as effective as the willingness of states and other 
stakeholders to implement the recommendations and offer protection on a non-
discriminatory basis to all who are affected by the acute and slow-onset effects of 
climate change.
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